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Summary: 
 
The literature generally agrees that the traditional insurance sector is not a source of 
systemic risk, and insurers are often considered to be shock absorbers rather than 
shock amplifiers. Yet, the evolution of the industry both in terms of structure 
(concentration of the reinsurers, increased linkages with banks, especially through 
bancassurance conglomerates) and in terms of techniques (securitization, 
monolines, derivatives) increased the systemic relevance of the insurers. 
 
 
Résumé: 
 
La littérature admet généralement que le secteur traditionnel de l'assurance n'est pas 
une source de risque systémique: les assureurs sont plutôt considérés comme des 
absorbeurs de chocs plutôt que comme des amplificateurs. Cependant, l'évolution du 
secteur, que ce soit en termes de structure (concentration des réassureurs, liens 
accrus avec les banques, et tout particulièrement par le biais de conglomérats de 
bancassurance) ou en termes de techniques (titrisation, monolines, dérivés) invite à 
étudier le potentiel systémique des assureurs. 
 
Keywords: Insurance, Systemic risk, International regulation  
JEL Classification: G22, G28, G32, G38, L51. 
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List of acronyms: 
 
 
 
ACPR  French Supervisor (Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution) 
CDS  Credit Default Swap 
CoVar  Co-Value-at-Risk index (for systemic risk) 
DIP  Distress Insurance Premium (measure of systemic risk) 
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority  
FGAP French Life-insurance guarantee scheme (fonds de garantie des 
assurances de personnes) 
FSB   Financial Stability Board 
GIC  Guaranteed Insurance Contract 
G-SIB  Global Systemically Important Bank 
G-SII  Global Systemically Important Insurers 
IAIS   International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
ILS  Insurance Linked Security 
ILW  Industry Loss Warranties 
MBS  Mortgage-Backed Security 
MES  Marginal Expected Shortfall 
NTNI  Non-Traditional/Non-Insurance activities 
ORSA  Own Risk and Solvency Assessment 
PC  Property-Casualty insurance (non-life) 
SES  Systemic Expected Shortfall 
SIFI   Systemically Important Financial Institution 
SRISK Systemic Risk index 
S1  Solvency 1 prudential regime 
S2  Solvency 2 prudential regime  
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Introduction: 
 
 
The issue at stake here is to assess whether the insurance sector should be 
considered a source of systemic risk and identify its potential vulnerabilities to 
impairments in the financial sector. We review writings from the academia, the 
supervisory authorities, and the industry, and come to the conclusion that traditional 
insurers represent a smaller risk to the system than the banking sector, chiefly 
because of the specificities of their business model (inverted cycle, asset-liability 
matching) and the hierarchical structure of the industry. The life segment, sharing 
common features with the banking sector’s saving products is more at risk than the 
property-casualty (PC) segment, but remains low risk, although much concern has 
arisen over the past years about life-insurers’ ability to cope with a prolonged low 
yield environment.  
This said, the recent developments in the financial sector, both in terms of structure 
(concentration, conglomerates) and in terms of products (credit derivatives, 
securitization) increase the linkages within the group of insurers, as well as between 
insurers and the rest of the financial world.  
Strikingly, the content of the extent literature on systemic risk in insurance is rather 
descriptive and policy oriented: quantitative analysis is more the exception than the 
rule.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 1 we provide a discussion on the 
standard definition of systemic risk and a description of the factors that are retained 
by the supervisors to assess the potential for systemic risk origination as well as 
systemic risk vulnerability; we also review some of the newly developed metrics 
provided by the academia. Section 2 assesses the systemic relevance of insurers 
against that of banks. We compare the two sectors in terms of industry organization 
and business models. Section 3 shows that the interconnections between insurance 
and the rest of the financial sector are significant, and getting even more so. Section 
4 focuses on particularly risky business lines pertaining to the Non-Traditional/Non-
Insurance category of newly developed activities. The special case of reinsurance is 
addressed in section 5, and open research questions in the last section. 
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I. Some definitions and assessments methods: 
 
 
1) Definition(s) 
 
The supervisors – e.g. the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) or the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) – define systemic risk as “the risk of 
disruption to the flow of financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment 
of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has the potential to have serious 
negative consequences for the real economy.”1  
 
In most of the literature, systemic risk relates to the failure of a significant portion of 
financial institutions, with a large negative impact on the real economy.2  
This large scale failure can either be triggered by a macroeconomic shock affecting 
simultaneously many institutions exposed in the same way, or it can propagate, 
through a network of financial interdependencies, from the initial impairment of a few 
institutions. The concept of systemic risk can thus be understood either as a 
structural vulnerability of the financial institutions to a given set of exogenous factors 
(system-wide shock), or as a consequence of spillover and contagion effects 
endogenous to the financial system (limited shock with subsequent contagion).  
 
Some authors, like Harrington (2009), restrict the understanding of systemic risk to 
“interdependency transmitted contagion” (p.802). For instance, the Committee on 
Capital markets Regulation (2009) defines the systemic risk as “the risk of collapse of 
an entire system or entire market, exacerbated by links and interdependencies, 
where the failure of a single entity or cluster of entities can cause a cascading 
failure”, p.ES-3).  
 
Another interesting qualification of the definition of systemic risk can be found in Billio 
et al (2012): “any set of circumstances that threatens the stability of or public 
confidence in the financial system” (p.537). Indeed, the authors recognize the self-
fulfilling propensity of events affecting the financial sector. 
 
Eventually, the geographical understanding of the concept of “system” is not always 
very clear as an institution could well be considered systemically relevant for a 
national economy without it being significant globally. Several authors in the literature 
addressed the issue of systemic risk at the national level.3  
 
 
 
2) Primary factors: 
 
To try to identify the different sources of impairments, the FSB indicated three main 
criteria at the entity level, namely size, interconnectedness and substitutability4 to 
which the IAIS added a timing criterion5 to account for the inverted production cycle 
that characterizes insurers.  
                                                     
1
 FSB (2009), p.5 ; IAIS (2009), p.1 ; See also EIOPA (2014a), p.55 
2
 Eling and Pankoke (2014), p.33 
3
 e.g. Minderhood (2003) for the Netherlands ; Cummins and Weiss (2012) for the US ; Frey et al (2013) for France. 
4
 FSB (2009), p.9  
5
 IAIS (2009), p.5 
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When conducting the identification of globally systemically important insurers though, 
the IAIS did not include the timing criterion (although they keep on recognizing the 
specificity of the insurance sector with respect to the timeframe of the potential 
outflows) but added global activity and non-traditional insurance to the list of criteria.6  
Once again, the proposed criteria should, according to the regulator, be used to 
identify systemically important financial institutions and not business activities. These 
criteria led to the identification of 9 insurance companies and 28 banks as globally 
systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) in 2012-2013.7 In November 
2014, the FSB issued a note indicating that the list remained unchanged. The IAIS 
methodology is expected to be updated by November 2015, and the list to be 
amended.8 
 
a) Size:  
Size is the first criterion that comes to mind when one tries to identify the 
determinants of systemic risk. “Too big to fail” means that a firm’s collapse would 
imply such an enormous cost for the economy at large that the government is forced 
to rescue it. Yet many argue that this criterion is too crude to actually reflect the 
potential for systemic risk. Indeed, if it is clear that a large institution’s default is more 
likely to perturb the system than a small firm, it is also true that small and large 
companies do not have the same probability of default in the first place. This caveat 
is particularly relevant for insurance companies as their raison d’être is the pooling of 
risk across time, geography, and business lines: larger insurers enjoy diversification 
benefits which may increase their resilience to shocks.9 Additionally, as noted by 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), “many small institutions can be ‘systemic as part of 
a herd’.” (p.21) Indeed, should many firms be exposed in a similar fashion to the very 
same risk, with identical incentives (may they be prudential, fiscal, competitive), a 
slight transformation in the global economic conditions is likely to induce a 
simultaneous parallel shift of all undertakings, with potentially dire consequences. 
 
b) Interconnectedness:  
As was mentioned earlier, the impairment of a large part of the system can be due to 
the simultaneous collapse of several independent institutions exposed to a similar 
risk, or to the propagation of a distress from an initial individual collapse. This 
propagation can only happen through a network of interconnections.  
Contagion can take several forms10: 
- Asset price contagion with the cascade of ‘fire sales’ 
- Counterparty contagion (either through bankruptcies or credit ratings 
downgrades) 
- Reputational contagion (where investors suspect that other firms may either 
be subject to the same exogenous distress that caused the initial collapse, or 
be exposed to the initial collapse: suspicion of connectedness can be a form 
of connectedness) 
- Irrationality (general withdrawal of funds irrespective of individual firms’ actual 
risk exposure). 
 
                                                     
6
 IAIS (2013), p.12 ; See also EIOPA (2014a), p.56 and 58 for the precise weighting of the different indicators used to define 
SIFIs. 
7
 See FSB (2012), p.3 for the list of global systematically important banks (G-SIBs)  
     and FSB (2013), p.4 for the list of global systematically important insurers (G-SIIs) 
8 
See FSB (2014), p.2 for the 2014 list of G-SIIs 
9
 IAIS (2011), p.9 ;  
     see also Geneva Association (2010): “It is not size as such that presents danger but undiversified size”, p.25 
10
 Harrington (2009), p.802 ; Eling and Pankoke (2014), p.8 
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Aside from proper contagion, we would like to point out that connectedness can also 
stem from the use of similar models, the reliance on similar indicators, with the 
consequence that a exogenous shock on one particular parameter induces many 
firms to react the same way. Prudential regulation could be considered a particular 
form of exogenous interconnectedness between supervised firms. 
 
c) Substitutability:  
This last common criterion for banks and insurers refers to the ability of competitors 
to take over the operations of a failed undertaking. Substitutability could be reduced 
should the defaulting institution be too large for its business to be absorbed by the 
competitors, or should the products commercialized be too complex or too specific. In 
order to be relevant for systemic risk, lack of substitutability must concern a service 
of critical importance (e.g. the payment and settlement systems, the liquidity 
provision ...).11 
In general, the insurance activities are deemed pretty substitutable as the sector is 
rather competitive. Yet the disappearance of a whole segment of the insurance 
industry could have significant long run effects both socially and economically: 
insurance fosters several economic activities that would probably not take place 
without proper coverage (e.g. some areas of medical specialization). 
The degree of actual substitutability can be very dependent on the approval policy 
undertaken by the national supervisory authority. 
 
d) Factors specific to the insurance sector: 
The previous three primary factors were common to both the banking and the 
insurance sectors. The following two are specific to the identification of globally 
systemically important insurers (G-SII).  
With the “global activity” factor, IAIS tries to measure the connection of a particular 
institution to the international markets. It can also help assess the degree to which a 
firm diversifies its “exposure” to regulatory frameworks and its opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrages. The “non-traditional insurance and non-insurance” factor aims 
at capturing the exposure to particularly risky operations. This factor will be 
addressed in more detail in IV.12 
 
e) General comments: 
Cummins and Weiss (2012) argue that what matters the most is not each criterion 
taken individually, but rather the interaction between these factors: “a large firm may 
not pose a systemic problem if it is not interconnected or if its products do not lack 
substitutes” (p.9) 
 
To determine the globally systemically important insurers (G-SII), IAIS constructed an 
index that weights differently the five factors. While “interconnectedness” and “non-
traditional insurance and non-insurance activities” account respectively for 40% and 
45% of the index, the other three account for 5% each.13 The weights are the result of 
international negotiations, and can appear quite arbitrary. Again, an update of the 
IAIS methodology is expected by November 2015. 
 
As was noted earlier, the FSB criteria were designed to be applied at the entity level. 
Other branches of the literature focus on business lines rather than on institutions to 
                                                     
11
 Cummins and Weiss (2012), p.11 
12
 EIOPA (2014a), p.58 
13
 EIOPA (2014a), p.58 
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identify systemic risk.14 This could indeed avoid regulatory arbitrage (e.g. risky 
activities could migrate to partner non-SIFI-labelled institutions) and market 
distortions (the likelihood of bailout would be larger for SIFIs than for other 
institutions). 
 
The time criterion, introduced by the IAIS in 2009, is particularly relevant as a slow 
pace of contagion can give leeway for the regulator to intervene. With respect to this 
particular criterion, insurance activities (especially PC and health) are very different 
from banks as their business model implies that claim settlement can take several 
months, contrary to margin calls for instance. When an insurer fails, it generally goes 
into a run-off process that can last for several years, while the collapse of a bank can 
happen almost overnight. This factor was very useful to compare the systemic 
relevance of banks and insurances, yet, surprisingly, it disappeared from the 
constitution of the G-SII index by IAIS in 2013. 
 
 
 
3) Contributing factors: 
 
To evaluate the resilience/vulnerability of financial institutions to an initial impairment, 
and therefore the potential for contagion, the FSB proposes three additional criteria, 
namely leverage, liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, and complexity.15  
 
a) Leverage: 
In the words of Cummins and Weiss (2012), “leverage is an indicator of vulnerability 
to financial shocks and also of interconnectedness. i.e., the likelihood that an 
institution will propagate distress in the system by magnifying financial shocks.” 
(p.13). Indeed, the more leveraged a position is, the more likely it is to go bankrupt in 
case of an adverse price movement due to the higher margin requirements. What is 
true for individual positions is also true for entire portfolios and firms: in periods of 
stress, highly levered firms are particularly vulnerable to loss spirals. 
 
b) Liquidity risk and maturity mismatch: 
Brunnnermeier and Pederson (2009) distinguish between two types of liquidity: 
market liquidity (which relates to the tradability of an asset), and funding liquidity 
(corresponding to the ability of a trader to fund its operations).  
Vulnerability to systemic risk can arise when a shock hits a company with a large 
exposure to illiquid assets. This indeed reduces the managerial leeway to cope with 
the shock, and could induce forced sales of asset for a depressed price. Note that 
the liquidity of a given asset is not exogenous and can be reduced in times of crisis. 
(cf. Gorton (2008), p.77 on rating-triggered fire sales). 
Funding liquidity relates to the ease with which investors and traders can raise 
money from the markets. For instance, the risk stems from a firm’s inability to fund its 
margin call, and the consecutive liquidation of its position (funding liquidity could also 
be induced by massive surrender, or by the inability to roll over short term funding). 16   
Maturity mismatch occurs when the assets and liabilities of the balance sheet differ in 
terms of duration or in terms of cash flows.  
                                                     
14
 See Geneva Association (2010): “Our aim is not to argue that the criteria are wrong, or that they do not apply to insurers, only 
that they need to be applied to activities and not to institutions”, p.24  
     see also Eling and Pankoke (2014), p.10 
15
 FSB (2009), p.13 – Cummins and Weiss (2013) suggest adding “government policy and regulation” to those three contributing 
factors (p.12) 
16
 See also Brunnermeier (2009), pp.91-92 
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c) Complexity: 
The definition of the last contributing factor is given by FSB (2009): “A complex 
institution is an institution or financial group that (a) operates diverse types of 
activities through numerous legal entities (e.g., simultaneously operating banking, 
insurance and securities subsidiaries); (b) operates across borders with centrally 
managed capital and liquidity (as opposed to simpler networks of national 
subsidiaries); and/or (c) has exposures to new and complex products and markets 
that have not been sufficiently tested” (p.13). This factor thus encompasses 
institutional, regulatory, and technical complexity. It is to be noted that complexity is 
often related to lack of transparency, which is even more of a concern than 
complexity itself.17 Indeed, opacity can trigger contagion, as nobody really knows the 
exposure of the different firms (counterparty, credit, liquidity, reputational risks). 
 
 
 
4) Measures of systemic risk:  
 
The identification criteria selected by the FSB are rather qualitative. They are keys for 
understanding the particular situation of a given firm, but they are definitely subject to 
interpretation, and as noted earlier, the interaction between the criteria is almost as 
relevant as the criteria themselves.  
Over the past five years, the academia tried to come up with synthetic measures of 
systemic risk using market data in order to provide a benchmark and enable 
comparisons between financial industries and between firms. In this part, we 
describe some of the most used metrics18. Note that these measures were primarily 
tailored for the banking sector, and might not reflect the specificities of the insurance 
industry. 
 
Acharya et al (2010) developed a measure of systemic risk to assess the contribution 
of individual firms to the vulnerability of the financial sector. The Systemic expected 
shortfall (SES) of a company corresponds to its own expected loss conditional upon 
the financial sector’s overall poor performance. In the words of the authors, it 
measures “its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is 
undercapitalized” (p.1). They classify the financial corporations into four sub-sectors 
(depository institutions, security and commodity brokers, insurance companies, and 
miscellaneous non-depository institutions including real estate firms), and find that 
the insurance industry as a whole is the least systematically risky of the four sub-
sectors. Yet they indicate that some insurance companies (especially those providing 
credit guarantees for structured products) got scores that were comparable to 
systematically risky banks19. 
The seminal paper by Acharya et al paved the way to the elaboration of the SRISK 
index by Brownlees and Engle (2011). This index measures the portion of the total 
expected system capital shortfall in a crisis that is due to a given firm (cf. p.8). It is a 
function of leverage and MES (marginal expected shortfall20) In the words of the 
authors, it evaluates “the expected equity loss of a firm when the overall market 
declines beyond a given threshold over a given time horizon” (p.2). When calculating 
                                                     
17
 See Cummings and Weiss (2012), p.15 
18
 For a detailed survey of the systemic risk measures, see for instance de Bandt et al (2013) 
19
 Acharya et al (2010), p.21 
20
 In Acharya et al (2010), MES is defined as the average net equity return of a firm during the 5% worst days for the market in a 
year (cf. pp.4, 15, 17). Yet, Brownlees and Engle (2011) define it as “the expected equity loss of a firm when the overall market 
declines beyond a given threshold over a given time horizon” (p.2). More specifically, in their paper, they consider a 2% market 
drop over one day, and 40% drop over six months (p.3). As such, Brownlees and Engle’s MES is probably conceptually closer 
to Acharya et al’s SES than to their own MES. 
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the SRISK for the European financial sector over the period 2000-2012, Engle, 
Jondeau and Rockinger (2012) found that banks were representing 80% of systemic 
risk, insurances 18%, and the contribution of financial services and real estate firms 
was negligible (p.20). 
 
Chen et al (2013) constructed a risk-neutral forward-looking systemic risk metric 
using CDS spreads and high frequency intra-day stock prices. Their indicator has two 
components: the probability of default of each entity and the default correlation. They 
show that there exist a strong bidirectional Granger-causality between the banking 
and insurance sector, yet when correcting for heteroskedasticity, they note that the 
influence of insurers on banks fades away while banks keep on having a persistent 
predictive power. The asymmetry of the connection is confirmed by stress testing. 
 
Using quantile regression, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) calculated the 1%-value-
at-risk (VaR) of the whole financial sector conditional on a particular institution being 
in trouble, which they labelled CoVaR. They additionally computed the ΔCoVaR as 
the difference between the CoVaR when the institution is in distress and its CoVaR in 
normal times. According to this metric, driving factors for systemic risk include size, 
leverage and maturity mismatch (p.20). Although they do not comment on that, the 
result of their regression of CoVaR on explanatory variables seems to indicate that 
insurers are less systemically relevant (p.39) 
 
The Distressed insurance premium (DIP) developed by Huang et al (2009, 2011) 
measures the insurance premium that protects against the distressed losses of a 
hypothetical portfolio consisting in the total liability of the banking sector in the 
coming 12 weeks. “Technically, it is calculated as the risk-neutral expectation of 
portfolio credit losses that equal or exceed a minimum share of the sector’s total 
liabilities.” (2011, p.7) This measure is computed using Monte Carlo simulations and 
daily data on CDS spreads (for the probability of default) and equity prices (to 
calculate the co-movements of equity returns). It differs from the SES in that the 
sector distress is measured as an absolute threshold instead of being measured as a 
quantile. Their decomposition of the DIP among the different banks in the sector 
shows that the marginal contributions are mainly driven by the bank size, and then by 
correlation and probability of default.(2011, p.21) This particular measure has not yet 
been applied to insurers. 
 
Eling and Pankoke (2014) consider that by definition, the systemic risk measures 
applied to the insurance sector (except ΔCoVaR) are more indicators of vulnerability 
to impairments of the financial sector than measures of actual contributions to 
systemic risk (p.21). It is clear indeed that the ΔCoVaR is the only one to assess the 
impact of the failure of a particular firm onto the system. The other measures 
evaluate the loss suffered by the firm when the system is in trouble. It should 
probably be possible to construct an indicator that would take into account all three 
aspects of systemic risk: origination, propagation and vulnerability. 
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II. Systemic risk in banking and insurance differ:  
 
Almost every piece of the surveyed literature analyzes systemic risk in insurance with 
respect to systemic risk in banking. It is true that systemic risk was identified first and 
foremost in the banking industry, and the FSB criteria were probably developed 
having this particular sector in mind. In line with this observation, we start our review 
with a brief comparison between banks and insurers. 
 
 
1) Banks 
 
The bank and insurance sectors differ fundamentally in terms of both their business 
model and their organization/structure.  
In terms of business model, banks are involved in maturity transformation and money 
creation: they collect deposits from the real economy, which are often callable at will, 
and distribute longer term credit to economic agents (with monetary creation through 
the fractional reserve mechanism). By doing so, they are transforming short term 
liabilities into longer term assets, and generally, the greater the duration gap, the 
larger the profits, which means that they have an incentive to increase the maturity 
mismatch.21 
In terms of structure, banks are largely interconnected in the very short run through 
the interbank market. They lend and borrow overnight funds from one another in 
order to comply with the technical and regulatory liquidity requirements.22  
One can easily see that the banking system is heavily relying on trust: indeed, banks 
need to be confident that their depositors will not come all at the same time to 
withdraw their funds (which would lead to a liquidity crisis as only a fraction of their 
deposits is kept, and the rest has been loaned), and to be confident that they will 
always find another bank to extend them overnight credit if needed. Trust can easily 
be lost though, which translates into bank runs and freezes of the interbank market 
(remember the definition of systemic risk by Billio et al (2013) and its emphasis on 
“public confidence in the financial sector”). Insurance, on the other hand, also need to 
fulfill their commitments, but rather in the longer run. 
 
 
 
2) Insurers 
 
The traditional insurers’ business model is totally different: in exchange for the 
payment of an upfront premium, the undertakings accept to compensate the 
policyholder for the loss he would undergo should a given risk materialize (non-life 
and health insurance): the business model is characterized by what is known as the 
inverted production cycle.23 The premiums are acquired and not redeemable to the 
policyholder. The payment of a claim depends on the occurrence of a particular 
event, which means that cash outflows are not subject to behavioral trends and are 
thus more predictable.24 Insurers “endeavor to exploit the benefits of diversification 
over time, geographies and between different lines of business. While diversification 
                                                     
21
 See Baluch et al (2011): “The banking sector is more susceptible to systemic risk due to lower capital to asset ratios, lower 
levels of cash reserves and the highly structured and illiquid instruments traded by banks.” (p.139) ; see also Thimann (2014), 
p.9 
22
 Thimann (2014), p.9 
23
 IAIS (2011), p.6 
24
 Cummins and Weiss (2012): “Thus, insurers are primarily funded through long-term sources that cannot be withdrawn on 
demand by policyholders. For banks, on the other hand, 82.5% of liabilities represent deposits, most of which are short-term 
and withdrawable on demand, such that banks have higher liquidity risk and maturity mismatch risk than insurers.” (p.19) 
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reduces the overall risk, the law of large numbers makes variations in the pattern of 
actual losses more predictable”.25 Using probability distributions, the insurer can thus 
estimate the likelihood and timeframe of the payouts (which he uses to calculate the 
premium in the first place), and will try to match the duration of its liabilities with that 
of its assets26. Additionally, even when a claim is filed, the settlement process can be 
rather long, which leaves time for the insurer to plan the necessary funding.27 In 
2009, the IAIS had considered a “time criterion” in its assessment of systemic risk for 
insurance. This was particularly relevant as a slow pace of contagion can give 
leeway for the regulator to intervene. With respect to this particular criterion, 
insurance activities (especially PC and health) are very different from banks as their 
business model implies that claim settlement can take several months, contrary to 
margin calls for instance. When an insurer fails, it generally goes into a run-off 
process that can last for several years, while the collapse of a bank can happen 
almost overnight. Yet, surprisingly, this factor disappeared from the constitution of the 
G-SII index by IAIS in 2013. 
The main risk facing an insurer is an unforeseen change in one or more parameters 
of the model, which could lead to a mispricing of the premium relative to the potential 
claims (technical risk).28 Last, the PC sector is rather competitive, with the 
consequence that the services provided are rather substitutable. For all these 
reasons, PC insurance is not considered systemically risky.29 
 
Life insurance products are deemed to be slightly more systemically relevant for two 
main reasons.  
On the one hand, the investment strategies pursued by the insurers are more risky: 
Indeed, in the words of Baluch et al (2011), “Life insurance products are based on 
the duration of human life and promise to pay fixed sums, set at inception of the 
contract, such payments not being so subject to the random occurrence of an 
unknown event. Therefore, life insurers invest in bonds and funds to achieve a rate of 
return requisite with their future obligations. These forms of investment carry a higher 
degree of market risk than non-life investments, which makes life insurers more 
susceptible to systemic risk during periods of market downturn”. (p.143) Other 
authors stress the fact that life insurers have a higher leverage (lower equity basis), 
are less diversified and are more invested in MBSs.30  
On the other hand, the premiums collected on those contracts a more callable than 
for other types of insurance. Yet the early withdrawal of funds is usually penalized, 
either contractually through lapse fees or fiscally31. Additionally, the State guarantee 
funds provide a strong protection to life insurance policyholders.32 As a consequence, 
                                                     
25
 IAIS (2011), p.25 
26
 IAIS (2011) emphasizes the role of Liability-driven investment either through cash-flow matching or duration matching (p.23); 
See also Geneva association (2010), p.36 ; Cummins and Weiss (2011), p.18 
27
 IAIS (2011): “it took seven quarters for the settlement of the reinsurance claims attributed to the loss of hurricane Katrina 
(2005) to reach 60% and 11 quarters for the settlement of the losses of the World Trade Center (2001) to reach the same 
threshold. And it too approximately another three quarters for Katrina-related payouts to reach 80%, while WTC claims took a 
total of 24 quarters to reach 80% of the ultimate payouts.” (p.6-7); See also: Geneva association (2010): “Insurance claims 
operate much more slowly than the margin call, collateral and depositor claims on banks” (p.28) and further: “The failure of a 
bank and the consequent closure of the wholesale funding markets could trigger the collapse of the banking system very 
quickly. By contrast, the wind-up of an insurer is likely to be a more orderly process” (p.29) 
28
 IAIS (2011) : “two major impairment factors both for life and non-life insurers are deficient loss provisioning and inadequate 
pricing – the most important causes in both segments – and rapid growth, which in many cases was coupled with deficiencies in 
risk management as well as in sound and balanced governance” (p.9). Hence the importance of a precise and reliable actuarial 
model of technical provisions to meet claims and unexpired risk. 
29
 Eling and Pankoke (2014), pp.17-18 
30
 Cummins and Weiss (2012) p.20 ; Grace (2011), p.11 Geneva Association (2010), p.15 ; Harrington (2009), p.804 
31
 See for instance Geneva Association (2012) 
32
 Cummins and Weiss (2012), p.20. In France, following the insolvency of Europavie in 1997, the legislator voted the creation 
of a life-insurance guarantee scheme: the Fonds de Garantie des Assurances de Personnes (FGAP). Although the fund is 
managed under private law by the industry, it is the French supervisory authority (ACPR) that determines when the money 
should be released to compensate for the insolvency of a particular undertaking. See Oxera (2007), pp.199-205 
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the IAIS (2011) indicates that “the historical evidence of insurance runs is limited” 
(p.7, 16). Cummins and Weiss (2012) argue that, should a run happen, it would only 
affect weak life-insurers and not propagate to the whole sector (p.20). Last, 
simulations seem to show that life insurers have enough liquidity to cope with a run.33 
In the end, Eling and Pankoke (2014) conclude that the life sector has a low 
vulnerability to systemic risk, at least for the part of insurance business where the 
policyholder bears the investment risk (no guaranteed payout). Fixed guarantees 
however seem to remain a concern for the supervisors (cf. e.g. the low yield module 
of the 2014 EIOPA Stress tests or the low yield environment add-on to the 2015 
French preparatory exercise to the ORSA)34, and Gollier (2015) even goes on to say 
that “in the event of a macroeconomic disaster, the rate guarantee would bankrupt 
most insurers” (p.134). 
 
 
The structure of the insurance market is much less horizontal than the bank sector. 
Insurance companies do not lend large amounts to one another35. However, they 
transfer a fraction of the risk they accepted to reinsurers and the reinsurance industry 
is fairly concentrated. Through this vertical connection, it thus appears that primary 
insurers might not be as insulated as they look. The role of reinsurance in systemic 
risk is treated separately, in part V. 
 
 
 
In short, banks and insurance differ on two main aspects36: 
- Insurers have a much lower liquidity risk and maturity mismatch (except in the 
low probability case of massive surrender), 
- The insurance sector is much less directly intraconnected (which doesn’t 
mean that it is not connected to the rest of the financial sector), 
- Due to the timing of its operations, the unwinding of an insurer is more likely to 
be an orderly process.37 
For these reasons, the traditional insurance sector is not considered a source of 
systemic risk. 
 
Let’s mention that although the FSB assessment is operated at the undertaking level, 
another strand of the literature focuses on business lines rather than on institutions to 
identify systemic risk.38 This approach could help avoid regulatory arbitrage (e.g. 
risky activities could migrate to partner non-SIFI-labelled institutions) and market 
distortions (the likelihood of bailout would be larger for SIFIs than for other 
institutions), but would require stricter ring-fencing of activities. 
 
  
                                                     
33
 Baranoff et al (2013) according to Eling and Pankoke (2014) 
34 
EIOPA (2014b) and ACPR (2015) 
35
 IAIS (2012): “The insurance market is characterized by an essentially hierarchical structure, with weak interconnectivity along 
vertical lines (ie. between cedants and reinsurers), and event weaker, or no connectivity al all, across primary insurers.” p.14 
36
 Geneva Association (2010): Insurance companies are deemed less vulnerable to systemic risk because “insurers do not rely 
on wholesale market funding for liquidity. They fund themselves through premiums, with long-term capital to support risk-taking 
position”. (p.20) ;  
cf. also Grace (2010): “Holding the special case of AIG aside, it is important to understand that traditional insurers are 
unlike banks in their interconnectedness and product risks.” (p.7) 
37
 Geneva Association (2010), p.29 
38
 See Geneva Association (2010): “Our aim is not to argue that the criteria are wrong, or that they do not apply to insurers, only 
that they need to be applied to activities and not to institutions”, p.24  
     see also Eling and Pankoke (2014), p.10 
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III. Yet they are connected (more and more so) 
 
If the traditional insurance sector is deemed less systemically relevant when 
analyzed independently, one need to keep in mind that they are not insulated from 
the rest of the financial world: to start with, insurers are major institutional investors, 
and they have a large exposure to the financial sector. For instance, IAIS (2011) 
indicates that, in 2010, the investment portfolio of European insurers entailed 26% of 
Financial Sector corporate bonds and 3% Financial Sector equity. (p.24) 
 
Additionally, recent research put emphasis on the increased connections in the 
financial industry during the 2000s. For instance, Baluch et al (2011) point out to a 
higher correlation between the bank and insurance equity in recent years (2004-
2009).39 Using principal component analysis and Granger-causality networks applied 
to monthly returns, Billio et al (2012) come to a similar conclusion with respect to the 
increased interconnectedness between hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and 
insurance companies. Going further, they analyze the direction of the relationships 
and find that the core of interconnectedness lies in both banks and insurers: in their 
own words, “the returns of banks and insurers seem to have more significant impact 
on the returns of hedge funds and brokers/dealers than vice versa.” (p.536), and 
later: “Over the recent period, our empirical results suggest that the banking and 
insurance sectors may be even more important sources of connectedness than other 
parts. (p.555). This last result is somewhat challenged by Chen et al (2013) who 
showed that the strong bidirectional Granger causality they had found between banks 
and insurers was becoming asymmetric, from banks to insurers, when controlling for 
heteroskedasticity. The result obtained with systemic risk metrics also go in the same 
direction (e.g. Acharya et al (2010) point out to the fact that although some insurers 
scored high in terms of systemic risk, the insurance sector as a whole was “the least 
systemically risky” (p.21)).  
 
The increased correlation between banks and insurers could stem from two (not 
mutually exclusive) sources:  
- On the one hand, the last decade saw the rapid development of 
bancassurance and other multiple-activities financial conglomerates, which 
institutionally links the business models in a way that is not always 
transparent.40 Here we get back the complexity and opacity issue that was 
raised by the FSB, and the potential leakages between lines of business for 
regulatory arbitrage purposes (as in communicating vessels). Considering the 
French financial sector, Hauton and Héam (2014) conclude that 
conglomerates “have a pivotal role to gather and distribute financial assets but 
not to gather and distribute riskiness” (p.25). According to the authors, this 
central role is mainly due to their size. There is actually an ongoing debate 
about the desirability of ring-fencing accounts in a financial conglomerate: 
Some argue that there should be strict ring-fencing in order to avoid healthy, 
regulated insurance subsidiaries to pay for the unregulated quasi-banking 
activities of another subsidy (as was the case with AIG Financial Products 
                                                     
39
 Baluch et al (2011): “It is clear from our analysis that the insurance and banking sectors have become increasingly connected 
over the last decade. Insurers (particularly life insurers) have extensively participated in the capital markets for additional 
profitability and risk transfer. This has left insurers exposed to systemic contagion via banks. Insurers have also become 
significant players in the credit protection market, leaving banks exposed to counterparty risk with potential systemic impact.” 
p.151 
40
 Baluch et al (2011) asserts: “Unsurprisingly, “bancassurers”—integrated financial services providers and insurers that have 
close affiliations with banks—have been among the major insurance market victims.” p.148. This statement is qualified by the 
industry as Geneva association (2010) states “Conglomerates with banks that had strong liquidity positions and low involvement 
in structured products came out of the crisis relatively unharmed (BNP Paribas, HSBC, Crédit Agricole)” (p.16) 
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division)41. Others warn that the collapse of a subsidiary might threaten the 
survival of the holding (and the other subsidiaries) if not prevented. The limited 
fungibility of capital or liquidity within a group could thus induce unnecessary 
failures.42 
- On the other hand, the non-traditional/non-insurance activities (quasi-banking) 
that developed recently might make insurers behave more like banks and 
other financial institutions.43 These NTNI activities and their implication for 
systemic risk are analyzed in the next section.  
 
 
  
                                                     
41
 Geneva Association (2010), p.17; Harrington (2009) 
42
 See for instance Radice (2010), p.32 
43
 Baluch et al (2011) write that the increased interconnectedness “does suggest that the insurance industry’s pursuit of capital 
investment as a value driver to compensate for underwriting results has resulted in its being exposed to market risk, which can 
be defined as “potential losses owing to detrimental changes in market prices and/or other financial variables influenced by 
prices”.” (p.139) 
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IV. Non-core activities and their impact for systemic risk: 
 
We now turn to what is referred to as “Non-traditional/non-insurance” (NTNI) or “non-
core” activities in the literature44. Following IAIS (2012), Eling and Pankoke (2014) 
define a traditional activity as being linked to risks that are mostly idiosyncratic, not 
correlated with each other, and not influenced by economic business cycles (p.15). 
They decompose the NTNI activities into two groups, namely the non-traditional 
insurance underwriting and the non-traditional insurance funding and investing 
activities. We will follow this structure here. 
 
 
 
1) Non-traditional underwriting 
 
The guaranteed annuities life insurance contracts and the credit protection 
instruments (credit insurance, credit guarantees, and derivatives) fall in the non-
traditional insurance underwriting category. 
 
a) Life insurance:  
Guaranteed annuities contract might be prone to massive surrender. In case the 
market rates are above the contractual rate, insurers may indeed be tempted to shop 
around for higher yield investments. On the other hand, one can imagine that 
concerns about the ability of an insurer to serve the guaranteed returns when market 
rates are low over a long period can foster lapses (cf. the current low yield 
environment). The cancellation fees and fiscal incentives are often considered a 
protection against such events, but surrenders are still possible.  
Other life insurance products of systemic relevance include separate accounts and 
group annuities45. Group annuities are insurance contracts negotiated by a 
corporation for its employees. In general, given the size of the contractor, its financial 
literacy and thus its bargaining power, these contracts entail better guarantees, and 
the enforcement thereof is more closely managed. 
Separate accounts are funds that an insurer manages separately from its general 
assets. They include all “non-euro funds”, that is unit-linked assets, segregated 
funds, retirement accounts, specific euro funds. According to Cummins and Weiss 
(2013), they can be used to offer “annuity products embedded with options, 
guaranteed investment products (GICs), and other banking type contracts” (p.21) 
Both products entail a large part of optionality and interconnectedness risk: “life 
insurers are often dealing with large corporate clients who control large blocks of 
assets, and such products are susceptible to withdrawals and other interruptions of 
cash flows during a crisis” (p.12). 
 
b) Credit protection: 
Concerning credit protection, one should make a strong distinction between credit 
insurance on the one hand, and credit guarantees and derivatives on the other. 
Indeed, the industry argues that credit and trade insurance cannot be considered a 
source of systemic risk given the substantial reserves it implies and the fact that the 
cash outflows are conditional upon an actual default. Credit insurance is primarily a 
                                                     
44
 In order to compute the “non-traditional insurance and non-insurance activities” component of its G-SII index, IAIS uses 
individual indicators on non-policy holder liabilities and non-insurance revenues, derivatives trading, short term funding, financial 
guarantees, minimum guarantee on variable insurance products, intra-group commitments, and liability liquidity. (cf. EIOPA 
(2014a), p.58) 
45
 Cummins and Weiss (2013), p.17. Note however that, contrary to Eling and Pankoke (2014), the authors consider group 
annuities and separate accounts as core life insurance activity (cf. p.29) 
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bilateral contract subject to exogenous risk factors and with only little potential 
contagion. Additionally, although the market is very concentrated (85% of the market 
share for the four largest providers in 2005), it is extremely small compared to the 
non-life industry as a whole (the premiums collected amounted to .5%).46 Last, Caja 
et al (2015) document the credit insurers’ ability “to limit or cancel the offered 
guarantees at any time, depending on the change in the credit quality of the 
insured firm, thus eventually on the evolutions of the business cycle and the 
macroeconomic environment” (p.2). 
 
On the contrary, credit guarantees by the monoliners as well as CDS underwriting 
are considered systemic risk factors. By definition, those products link the insurance 
sector with the remaining of the financial sector, and thus increase 
interconnectedness. Moreover, they are very sensitive to overnight market 
downturns, as well as to credit rating downgrades (liquidity risk)47. Not only are the 
credit guarantees subject to contagion as they are spread thorough the market, but 
they are also at risk of hoarding effects, as different credit guarantees will react in a 
similar way to similar indicators (ratings) in case of a large economic downturn. There 
is a large consensus in the literature concerning the contribution of CDS to systemic 
risk, or at least to the vulnerability to systemic risk.48 
 
 
 
2) Non-traditional funding and investing 
 
On the funding and investing side, we find: 
- the securitization of upfront payments and future profits, which according to 
the IAIS exposes the investor to interest rate risk (implied guarantees, 
insurance risks, market risk), but is not yet big enough to be considered 
systemically relevant49. We lack information on the development of these new 
funding strategies, and it is particularly important to monitor them carefully. 
- the excessive reliance on short term financing, which increases the risk of fire 
sale (cf. securities lending, credit rating utilization and issuance of commercial 
paper).50 The recourse to these short term strategies probably takes origin in 
the search for yield associated with the low interest rate of the past decade. 
By definition, these instruments increase liquidity risk and maturity mismatch, 
and can thus contribute to increasing systemic risk. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
46
 Geneva Association (2010), p.58 
47
 Drake and Neale (2011) 
48
 Eling and Pankoke (2014), p.23, Baluch et al (2011), pp.144-148 ; Cummins and Weiss (2011), p.40; IAIS (2011), p.12; 
Geneva Association (2010), p.18 
49
 IAIS (2012), p.27 
50
 Geneva Association (2010), p.55 ; Harrington (2009), p.790 
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V. Reinsurance 
 
As we already mentioned, the insurance sector is hierarchical51, meaning that 
insurers do not have many relationships between themselves, but do have ongoing 
business with the same few reinsurers. The insurers might therefore not be as 
insulated as they seemed at first sight. 
 
The reinsurance market has indeed become particularly concentrated and 
interconnected over the past 20 years. Cummins and Weiss (2002) note that the 
market share of the top ten reinsurers went up to 52% in 1998 from 35% in 1991 
(p.22), and Park and Xie (2012) report that this share reached 79% in 2009, with 
60% for the first five undertakings (p.4 and 8). Several authors point out at the fact 
that the collapse (or downgrade) of a particular reinsurer could have an impact not 
only on the primary insurers who ceded the risk in the first place, but also on the 
other reinsurers through the retrocession spiral. Indeed, Park and Xie (2012) show 
that the downgrade of a reinsurer both increases the likelihood of downgrading for 
the counterparty primary insurers and negatively impacts their stock prices. However, 
the mainstream view is that the vertical structure of the sector limits intra-insurance 
contagion as well as spillovers to the rest of the financial sector. Indeed, the scenario 
analyses conducted by Park and Xie (2012) for the US, Van Lelyveld et al (2011) for 
the Netherlands, and Frey et al (2013) for France conclude that even the collapse of 
several international reinsurance companies would not translate into many primary 
insurers defaults. For instance, Park and Xie (2012) document that even if one of the 
top three global reinsurers were to default on 100% of their recoverable, this would 
only lead to a downgrade for about 2% of American insurers, and to insolvency for 
1%52. Frey et al (2013) run two stress tests: the first with the idiosyncratic collapse of 
a reinsurer (zero recovery rate), and the second assuming that primary insurers 
would have to cope with a large-scale catastrophe without the help of reinsurers. In 
the first case, they show that even a simultaneous default of all reinsurers would not 
imply any insolvency of the French primary insurers (provided that the off balance 
sheets guarantees of the reinsurers are effective). In the second case, the 
catastrophe would not affect life insurers, but would lead to insolvency for 14% of 
non-life insurers. However, it is to be noted that the analysis is conducted on solo 
entities, and does not take into account potential support by the group holding. A 
stress test by the Group of 30 (2006) concludes that even a failure of 20% of the 
reinsurance capacity would be unlikely to neither induce widespread insolvencies 
among primary insurers nor affect significantly the real economy. (pp.31-39) 
 
The industry and the supervisor do not consider traditional reinsurance to be 
systematically relevant. To reach this conclusion, they point out to several factors: 
- The small size of the market. Indeed, in 2010, the market capitalization of the 
top 10 global reinsurers taken together was equivalent to that of the two 
largest insurers and to less than half that of the single largest bank. In terms of 
total assets, the top ten reinsurers were equivalent to the largest insurer and 
to a third of the largest bank.53 Additionally, IAIS (2012) indicates that only 5% 
of the global volume of primary insurers’ premiums is ceded to reinsurers, and 
only 0.6% to retrocessionaires (p.26) 54 
                                                     
51
 IAIS (2012), p.10 
52
 Park and Xie (2012), p.28 
53
 IAIS (2011), p.21 
54
 A clearer breakup of the insurance and reinsurance global activity by business is given for year 2008 in Geneva Association 
(2010), pp.25 and 52. For life, the reinsurance premiums represent 2.4% of the primary premiums, and the retrocessions 55% of 
the ceded premiums (that is 1.3% of the primary premiums). For non-life activities, the reinsurance premiums amount to 5.6% of 
primary premiums, and retrocessions to 28% of ceded premiums, that is 1.6% of primary premiums). 
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- The diversification of primary insurers’ exposure to the reinsurers, which 
makes them less sensitive to a particular entity’s failure. Note however that 
Park and Xie (2012) calculated the Herfindahl index of the US insurers’ 
reinsurance portfolios, and came up with a mean index of more than 0.6 which 
leads them to conclude that they are not diversified enough.55 
- The low probability of default of reinsurers (historically, and with regards to 
credit ratings) linked with their liability structure, their low leverage, and the 
slow claim settlement process. Indeed, IAIS (2011) records 29 reinsurers’ 
failure between 1980 and 2011, for a total cumulated loss of 0.43% of the 
ceded premiums in this period. IAIS also reports an overall industry’s solvency 
ratio of 250% in 2010, and comments that in order to go under a 100% ratio 
the economy at large would need to suffer a total loss equivalent to the cost of 
all great world-wide catastrophes between 1950 and 2010 (p.28). This result 
should be qualified though as the numbers were calculated using the S1 
framework. 
- Last, even more than for primary insurers, the temporal aspect of reinsurers’ 
cash outflows is particularly important in determining their systemic relevance. 
Indeed, claim settlement can be a very long process, and the run-offs can last 
for decades. Primary insurers do not apparently rely on quick access to 
recoverable.  
 
This said, there is a general consensus on the potential systemic risk associated with 
some non-traditional reinsurance activities, especially the Industry loss warranties 
and the CDSs.  
“Industry loss warranties (ILW) are a specific reinsurance or derivative contracts that 
tie any claim payments to a predefined catastrophic loss level incurred by the whole 
industry (the industry loss trigger) or a subset thereof rather than an individual 
company’s aggregate losses from a catastrophic event.” (IAIS (2012), p.28). 
According to the supervisor, ILW are usually not collateralized and are characterized 
by the absence of insurable interest. They share common features with financial 
derivatives and are a source of credit risk as well as of basis risk.  
We already mentioned that CDSs had a substantial potential for systemic risk. Swiss 
Re (2003) stresses that the link they create with the banking sector is a source of 
vulnerability. It is to be noted however that their contribution to the market 
significantly declined since 2003, to represent less than 0.02% of the supply in 
2010.56 
 
Other non-traditional reinsurance activities, such as Cat-bonds and finite reinsurance, 
are deemed less relevant for systemic risk assessment. Catastrophe bonds, which 
are a particular case of insurance-linked securities, allow the reinsurer to transfer 
large peak risks to the financial markets. Cat-bonds appear not to be correlated to 
financial markets returns, and are thus a good instrument for diversification 
purposes.57 It is also to be noted that the market for cat-bonds is very small, which 
limits its impact on systemic risk.58 
 
As for finite reinsurance, it is broadly defined by IAIS (2006) as the “entire spectrum 
of reinsurance arrangements that transfer limited risk relative to aggregate premiums 
                                                     
55
 Park and Xie (2012), p.12. They mention though that the index decreased slightly between 2002 and 2009, from 0.657 to 
0.639. 
56
 IAIS (2012), p.30 
57
 Cummins and Weiss (2009), p.532 
58
 IAIS (2011, 2012) 
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that could be charged under the contract”59 (p.5). These financial reinsurance 
contracts were designed initially to smooth the variations of insurance income over 
the years. They have come under the supervisor’s scrutiny as they were sometimes 
used to reduce the prudential requirements without operating a real risk transfer, thus 
sharing common features with credit intermediation. Currently, the regulator requires 
that there be a “significant amount of risk transfer” and considers that, as the 
contracts “do not entail leverage and do not extend beyond the two contracting 
parties”, they do not represent a source of systemic risk. 60 
 
Last, the industry acknowledges that the opacity of reinsurance networks might lead 
to reinsurance spirals, and warns that certain contracts with rating triggers (which 
allow a counterparty to cancel it in case of a downgrade) can be a source of risk.61 
One possible channel of contagion stems from the loss of private information 
gathered on small insurance companies by a large reinsurer that goes bankrupt. 
Following the collapse of such a large reinsurer, some small insurance companies 
with very specific activities might not be able to find a proper reinsurance at 
reasonable price, with possible spillovers. 
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 Cf. also Group of 30 (2006), p.69 
60
 IAIS (2012), p.26 
61
 Group of 30 (2006), p.38 
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VI. Conclusion and further research 
 
This review of literature showed that the insurance sector in general had less 
systemic relevance than the banking industry. The business model and the structure 
of the sector tend to make it a risk absorber rather than a risk contributor. However 
some recent developments in the financial industry (concentration of the reinsurers, 
bancassurance conglomerates, credit guarantees, securitization…) might lead to an 
increased vulnerability to contagion or even to systemic risk origination. 
 
As we mentioned earlier and as could be seen in this review, most of the literature on 
systemic risk in insurance took the form of a qualitative assessment based on FSB 
criteria or on default track records (case studies). Quantitative metrics of systemic 
risk contributions were only recently developed (and they are not necessarily tailored 
to the specificities of the insurance industry). The literature is still in the process of 
comparing the adequacy and relative predictive power of these measures, but they 
have already been used a couple of times to identify likely determinants of systemic 
relevance (on the one hand, Cummins and Weiss (2013) use SRISK to show that 
separate accounts and group annuities increase the systemic risk of the life-entities 
that propose them; on the other hand, Weiß and Mühlnickel (2013) use MES and 
ΔCoVaR to show that size, and reliance on investment income and non-policyholder 
liabilities were good predictors of systemic vulnerability). More work on this line could 
be very useful (quantify the systemic relevance of other business lines, of financial 
instruments, of conglomerates62, and of reinsurers for example). Concerning the 
indicators, another issue of paramount importance is to find a way to disentangle 
more clearly the likelihood that a particular institution be a source of systemic risk 
from the resilience or vulnerability to systemic shocks. In short, would an institution 
be likely an originator, a propagator, or a mere victim of systemic risk? The metrics 
developed so far tend to measure the latter rather than the former. 
 
The contribution of supervision to systemic risk has still not been investigated 
thoroughly: in particular, the impact of the labelling of SIFI on the firm’s behavior (i.e. 
the bailout guarantees and what they imply in terms of increased moral hazard and 
market distortion63); the possibility of regulatory arbitrage; and the procyclicity of the 
measures for instance are still open research questions.64 Additionally the cost of 
regulation for the sector (in terms of productivity, efficiency, innovation…) as well as 
for the taxpayer (guarantees) has not been properly assessed as of today, nor its 
significance with respect to the potential cost of an unregulated system. Such a cost 
benefit analysis could lead to a more parsimonious regulatory framework or to ring-
fencing for instance. 
 
It would be very interesting to investigate the indirect connection that exists between 
the financial institutions merely because they focus on similar indicators and rely on 
similar models to shape their course of action (S1 or S2 frameworks, ratings…). Such 
a hoarding effect would probably not be captured by the systemic metrics, and 
nevertheless the impact on the economy could be tremendously important, given the 
major role of insurers on the investment side (think for instance about the downgrade 
of a Tier1 asset, and the potential massive disinvestment that could follow; think also 
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 Cf. the current ongoing research by Hauton and Héam (2014) 
63
 See for example Harrington (2009), p.805 
64
 See for instance Billio et al (2012): “because they are more highly regulated, banks and insurers are more sensitive to value-
at-risk changes through their capital requirements; hence, their behavior may generate endogenous feedback loops with 
perverse externalities and spillover effects to other financial institutions.” (p.536);  
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about the hesitations concerning the valuation of sovereign bonds in solvency 
requirements)65. 
 
It is often said that the insurance sector does not qualify for the “lack of 
substitutability” criterion for systemic relevance given its highly competitive nature. 
We would like to point out that this argument applies to firms, but not necessarily to 
lines of business. Some particular insurance and reinsurance activities could very 
well disappear because of legal evolutions, and not be replaced by any substitute, 
with large social consequences (cf. medical practices insurances).  
 
The issue of massive surrender, although deemed low probability, should certainly be 
examined carefully. For example, a scenario of raising interest rates after a long 
period of stagnation at low levels could very well lead to high lapse rates for 
traditional insurers, with policyholders turning to newly chartered life insurance 
companies not bound by their low yield assets and able to offer higher returns.66 
 
Last, the analysis of systemic relevance could also be extended to other major 
players of the financial markets, such as pension funds. The “real life” impact of the 
collapse of such an institution could be dramatic. We could not find many documents 
on this particular issue. 
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 On the impact of valuation standards in insurance on financial stability, see for instance Trainar (2008) 
66
 See also the problems faced by the Japanese insurance industry in the context of low interest rates: Bernard and La Motte 
(2014) 
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